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This publication looks at the relationship between land tenure, land use, and 
population movements, and conﬂict, deﬁned here as large-scale, violent conﬂict. 
The concepts are illustrated with case studies by the African Centre for Technology 
Studies (ACTS) on Rwanda, Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and 
Burundi.1 
The relationship between land and conﬂict is intuitive. Historically, land has been 
signiﬁcant in war in the form of a ‘prize’ of territorial control enjoyed by the 
victors at the expense of the vanquished – losing groups would often be forced 
to ﬂee, relinquishing their homes, ﬁelds and properties. More recently however, 
increased interest in conﬂict analysis has revealed various complex relationships 
between control over land (and land-based resources) and conﬂict. Combatants 
involved in conﬂict within states – by far the most signiﬁcant kind of conﬂict 
today – often claim that unequal access to land is one of the causes of violence. 
During conﬂict, land access is affected not just for belligerents, but for entire 
communities, who become targets of violence due to the ethnicization of conﬂict. 
And in post-conﬂict situations, the land and shelter needs of returning internally 
displaced populations (IDPs) and refugees must be carefully managed in order to 
avoid dangerous disputes and further violence. 
This problem is compounded in many developing countries by the challenging 
structural nature of land ownership, which may include demographic pressure, 
gross inequalities between and within communities, inadequate land administration 
and different conceptions of land tenure according to different land use norms. 
Therefore, land policies in post-conﬂict countries – and indeed, across the world – 
should consider the possible destabilizing effects that can result from inequalities 
and inefﬁciencies. In Africa as elsewhere, a key problem relates to the mismatch 
between customary land tenure systems, which are undergoing changes related to 
modernization and globalization, and state-managed systems based on western 
models. For this reason, the founder of ACTS, Prof. Calestous Juma, argued in 
1996 that, “the way land use is governed is not simply an economic question, but 
also a critical aspect of the management of political affairs. It may be argued that 
the governance of land use is the most important political issue in most African 
countries.”2
This Ecopolicy is one of the outputs of a twelve-month research project, part 
of ACTS’ continuing work on the “Ecological Sources of Conﬂicts in Sub-
Saharan Africa”. The ﬁrst project, launched in the year 2000, examined the extent 
to which environmental resource scarcity and ecological stress contribute to 
2political conﬂicts in Sub-Saharan Africa. This project, funded by the John D. and 
Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), also aimed at enlarging the body of knowledge 
and information for conﬂict prevention and management, and promoting dialogue 
between environmental agencies and those engaged in conﬂict prevention and 
management.  Consultative sessions were held with key government and policy 
maker constituencies to promote dialogue on the importance of environmental or 
ecological factors in political conﬂicts and the means by which these factors could 
be addressed in conﬂict prevention and management. The ﬁrst phase of the project 
came to an end in July 2002, with the publication of case studies in a volume, 
Scarcity and Surfeit: the Ecology of Africa’s Conﬂicts, published jointly by ACTS 
and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS).  
Since September 2003, ACTS, in collaboration with other organisations including 
ISS, has conducted research into the issue of contested rights to land and natural 
resources in conﬂict zones, with an emphasis on areas affected by waves of 
outward and inward migration in Burundi, Rwanda, and Eastern DRC. The 
objective is to inﬂuence ongoing processes of peacebuilding, land reform and 
debates on land rights in the Great Lakes Region, particularly as they affect or are 
affected by displaced populations.  Activities include desk and ﬁeld research, and 
a regional multi-stakeholder conference to present ﬁndings to relevant government 
actors, international and regional organisations and civil society groups. Research 
ﬁndings will be published in various formats, including a volume to be released 
in early 2005. This publication summarizes some of the ﬁndings of this latest 
research, and puts them into a broader context which has been developed through 
reference to other studies.3 
1. Land as a Source of Conﬂict in Africa
The relationship between environmental factors, including environmental change, 
and conﬂict has been the subject of intense debate over the past ﬁfteen years or 
so. Major projects by research groups at the University of Toronto, University 
of California Berkeley, Center for Security Studies in Zurich, Swiss Peace 
Foundation, and the World Bank, amongst many others, have suggested that a 
control over number of renewable and non-renewable natural resources have been 
contributing factors in many conﬂicts. In the past decade, a number of processes 
have focused speciﬁcally on linkages between land and conﬂict. These include 
desk-based research projects, conferences, and the generation of toolkits and 
Land, Conﬂict and Livelihoods  in the Great Lakes Region.  Testing Policies to the Limit C. Huggins, P. Kamungi, J. Kariuki, H. Musahara, J. S. Oketch, K.Vlassenroot, and J.W.Wakhungu
3conceptual frameworks. For example, the OECD DAC guidelines on Helping 
Prevent Violent Conﬂict refer to land issues as a root cause of conﬂict; USAID’s 
guidelines on Conducting a Conﬂict Assessment note that land is an important 
tool or reward in violent political struggles between elites; and UN-HABITAT 
and the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) have 
both started to develop conceptual frameworks for understanding the impacts of 
conﬂict on land administration, and addressing these impacts in the post-conﬂict 
context.4 
There are of course multiple views on the relationship between land and conﬂict. 
In particular, the issue of ‘equity’ is controversial: while common sense would 
dictate that unequal access to land (and other resources) between individuals is 
a likely cause of conﬂict, and some analysts argue that this is indeed the case; 
others have found no such correlation. To some extent these divergent opinions 
are inevitable, given the complexity of the issues; however, they may also 
represent methodological differences, with detailed micro-level case studies 
often suggesting a correlation; while macroeconomic analysis, which is less 
sensitive to human perceptions (as opposed to ‘objective’ indicators) tends to 
suggest otherwise.5 One particularly important ﬁeld is the analysis of inequality 
between ‘groups’ of different kinds: the deﬁnition of the group (e.g. along ethnic, 
religious, economic, or other lines) is a key variable, especially as perceptions of 
group identities change, for example through the ‘boundary formation’ activities 
of political entrepreneurs. 
In general, it is clear that the key determinant of whether violence will occur is 
not the extent of grievance in any given society, but rather the forms of social 
and political organization and cleavage which enable ‘boundaries’ to be formed 
(popularized as ‘us and them’ relationships) and people mobilized for violent 
ends.6 Also, the nature of mediation and dispute resolution mechanisms are 
important factors in determining whether parties involved in a conﬂict will resort 
to violence: if they are seen as partial or ineffective, violence is more likely.7 
There is evidence of this in Ituri territory, Northeastern DRC. The effectiveness 
of mediation mechanisms was reduced after the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Force 
(UPDF) started to support certain actors at the expense of others. After the arrival 
of the UPDF, land issues became triggers for extreme violence. The district 
authorities were compromised through their involvement in the conﬂicts, and 
hence lost the impartiality that is needed to mediate such conﬂicts.8 The close 
connection between the authorities and the UPDF (based partly on exploitation 
of gold, livestock and other resources) at the start of the mass violence further 
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blurred the lines between the administration, military forces, and economic 
agents, making mediation impossible.
The increased focus within the international humanitarian, development, and 
security communities on the relationships between land and conﬂict, and the 
improved conceptual understandings that have resulted, are important. However, 
there are risks associated with such research, and they should be clearly articulated. 
Any research on conﬂicts over and around natural resources risks over-simplifying 
the issues, as conﬂict is a multi-causal phenomenon, which cannot be understood 
solely from a single perspective. Most importantly perhaps, research on land-
related issues tends to concentrate attention at the ‘local’ or ‘national’ level – 
perhaps with regional tangents taken into account. The ‘global’ aspects of the 
conﬂict are often forgotten. Africa, as much as any other continent, is subject to 
the forces of globalization, and has indeed been massively affected by foreign 
inﬂuences for over a century. 
Colonization had a devastating effect on land use patterns in some countries, 
especially in Southern Africa, and the effects of land alienation, dualistic 
systems of land tenure and agrarian production, and racism are still felt today. 
Colonization, imperialistic resource-capture strategies, and resultant processes of 
underdevelopment (related to over-reliance on export of raw materials) remain 
important foci of analysis. In some cases, the role of international commodity 
chains in African conﬂict is quite obvious – exploitation of Columbium-tantalite 
in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), for sale to multinational 
companies and eventual use in electronic devices, has been documented by ACTS, 
amongst others.9 
In terms of agriculture and pastoralism, the marginal way in which African 
economies have been incorporated into the world trade system, and the terms of 
international trade as dictated by agreements under the World Trade Orgainsation 
(WTO) and other frameworks, all limit the options open to communities, 
the indigenous private sector, and governments. Simultaneously, economic 
liberalization policies (associated with past conditionalities of international 
ﬁnancial institutions and present economic ‘received wisdom’ following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union) facilitate the investment of international capital in 
African countries, not always to the beneﬁt of the poor majority of inhabitants. 
Hence, while addressing land-related issues, researchers and policy-makers 
should investigate the wider boundaries of the problem, and recommend solutions 
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with broader perspectives in mind. For example, while subsistence agriculture is 
the daily reality for perhaps the majority of the African population, this need not 
be so – movement of goods and labour, potential improvements in technological 
capacity, and the nature and level of investments from the developed world are all 
relevant questions.
The Multi-dimensional Nature of Land Issues
Land tenure encompasses a ‘bundle’ of rights. Land tenure is usually divided into 
the rights to use, enjoy the fruits of, and dispose of (or alienate, sell) property. 
In other words, there is a proprietary aspect (the right to ‘hold’ land) and also a 
management aspect. These aspects (with their innumerable sub-components) may 
or may not be the responsibility of the same person(s). Land tenure rights may be 
held by individuals or groups, depending on the rules of the system in operation. 
Customary systems, especially in situations where land is relatively abundant or 
dominated by pastoralist land uses, are often predicated upon group (‘corporate’) 
membership.
Land rights, like all property rights, are socially-mediated entitlements.  They 
establish a relationship between the holder of property and a certain set of resources. 
The legitimizing norms and institutions of societies maintain this relationship 
over time, and defend it against trespass or other interference. Because of the 
numerous norms and regulations that make up property rights, they are, in the 
end, ‘relationships between people’.10  The stability and local relevance of social 
groups is then important for the security of existing rights to land. This explains 
the tenacity of customary forms of tenure, despite the fact that statutory law has 
largely ignored them (or even outlawed them), for decades.
In addition to the ‘legalistic’ aspects of land access and control, there are other 
dimensions - economic, political, social and spiritual -- which are equally important. For 
example, land may often be signiﬁcant as: a means of production; an area where political 
authority is expressed and taxes may be raised (the concept of ‘territory’); a means by 
which families and individuals maintain social status; and also as a source of feelings 
of ancestral ‘belonging’, as ancestors are buried within traditional territories. Land is 
therefore by deﬁnition an emotional issue, and linked to cultural and other values. 
Land issues may also be ‘embedded’ within other kinds of struggles; for example, 
over mining rights, protected areas, hunting concessions, etc.11 Control over such 
natural resources affects land uses and often, development of natural resources 
6for commercial purposes involves individualisation of communal (indigenous) 
rights, with loss of access resulting for some users.
Land issues are therefore much broader than usually encapsulated in the mandate 
of a ministry for lands, or a land policy. A range of other ‘sectors’ and activities 
have important links with or impacts on land use and tenure, including agricultural 
policies, natural resource management systems, policies on urbanisation, 
infrastructure development, non-agricultural employment creation, internal and 
international migration, and water management. This requires a multi-sectoral 
approach and considerable inter-ministerial coordination, which is not always 
achieved. The Rwandan land policy development process, for example, did not 
incorporate all the relevant ministries until relatively late. Key stakeholders within 
government would include, for example, the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry 
for Local Government and Social Affairs, Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning, and the Ministry of Justice. However, the policy makes extensive 
reference to the centrality of the Ministry of Lands, Environment, Forestry, Water 
and Natural Resources (MINITERE) and there is insufﬁcient reference to relevant 
institutional linkages and policy synergies (and possible policy conﬂicts). In such 
cases, intensive and systematic inter-Ministerial planning will be necessary to 
ensure that the policy can be implemented successfully. 
In countries such as Burundi and Rwanda, land policies and laws are being 
reformed within a strategy framework that should be captured in the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), as well as other national plans (such as the 
Vision 20:20 document in Rwanda). In several countries, the general framework 
represented by the PRSP has not been given adequate detail through sectoral 
plans, and the trade-offs and opportunity costs involved in particular strategies 
have not been clearly articulated. For example, the Burundian Interim PRSP does 
not identify many concrete options for the planned agricultural specialisation, 
such as developing niche markets.
Indirect Causes of Conﬂict; Land Access and Structural Poverty
In some countries, lack of access to land is a major livelihood constraint for many 
people. In parts of the Great Lakes Region, the inhibiting effects of inequitable 
access are exacerbated by general land scarcity. In Eastern DRC for example, vast 
amounts of fertile land have been alienated from customary tenure systems, to the 
detriment of local peasants; ﬁrst by the colonial power, and then by customary 
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Land sales were facilitated by the co-existence of ‘customary’ and ‘modern’ land 
access systems, and became more frequent after the introduction of a 1973 land 
law, which discarded customary law, so that land occupied under customary rules 
no longer had any legal status. 12 The law was to be supplemented by a Presidential 
Decree designed to offer some security to customary land users, but the Decree 
was never issued. This forced most peasants into a position of general uncertainty 
about their legal access to land, and proved to be a perfect instrument for the 
politically or economically powerful to appropriate any land not yet titled. The 
traditional authorities became the privileged intermediaries for the sale of land, 
and the resulting insecure or insufﬁcient access to land is a signiﬁcant factor in 
the impoverishment of thousands of rural people, particularly in certain parts of 
North and South Kivu Provinces, which have high population densities. Poverty 
is a reason for many people’s recruitment into armed groups: while they are 
rarely well paid, militia members or members of regular forces are able to sustain 
themselves by looting.13  
In Rwanda, land scarcity is associated strongly with poverty, particularly because 
there are few off-farm opportunities available in rural areas today. Lack of land, 
largely due to land fragmentation through inheritance were key aspects of the 
‘structural conﬂict’ that underpinned violent conﬂict. During the genocide, 
violence was directed not just at Tutsi, but also at some Hutu land-owners who 
were involved in land disputes. Also, many of those civilians who took part in 
the violence were the ‘lumpen-proletariat’ in urban areas; the dispossessed, such 
as the homeless, street vendors, and garbage collectors. The powerless suddenly 
became ‘powerful’, given a license to kill, steal, and rape with impunity.14 It is 
highly likely that many of these people had migrated to Kigali and other towns 
due to lack of land access in their rural homes.
In the case of Burundi, while the discourse on the conﬂict is often dominated by 
‘ethnic’ arguments, most informed analysts agree that the roots of the conﬂict 
lie in unequal distribution of economic resources and political power, which in 
effect results in relative deprivation and differential access to life chances and 
choices, including education, subsistence, security, leadership, and participation.15 
Agriculture, which forms the mainstay of 90 per cent of the population, is under-
funded and neglected compared to the military and state-controlled industrial 
ﬁrms, some of which control the processing and marketing of coffee and other 
export crops. These ﬁrms beneﬁt from low ‘farm-gate’ prices for agricultural 
produce (generally way below regional averages) and privileged access to foreign 
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through politically-motivated appointments. 
Land is also used as a system of reward in order to sustain political patronage 
systems. Contradictions and disconnects in the current land tenure systems 
continue to create loopholes that are exploited through irregular allocation of state 
land to individuals in positions of inﬂuence in government, military and the civil 
service. Competition for control of state power and related economic rewards in 
addition to pressure for reforms provoke the ruling elite to protect their position 
through repression and violence.  
Therefore, in such cases, lack of access to land, and constrained livelihood options 
due to lack of market access and lack of access to agricultural technologies, 
contribute to poverty. Poverty is in turn a ‘background cause’ of conﬂict, which is 
generally held to make conﬂict more likely.
Interactions between Customary and State-Managed Tenure Systems
In many, if not most African countries, customary land tenure systems are far 
more prevalent than formal systems, covering more than 90 per cent of the total 
land area.16 In Rwanda for example, something less than 5 per cent of the land 
area is formally registered, while the ﬁgure is below one per cent in the DRC. 
This is a fundamental issue at several levels of analysis and in several contexts, 
such as in post-conﬂict situations. In terms of land-related causes of conﬂict, 
it is highly signiﬁcant because the mismatch between the conceptual basis of 
customary tenure and ‘modern’ tenure systems has in countless countries led to 
those with customary rights being dispossessed by those able to access formal, 
written systems, and hence acquire a formal title, lease, or other form of control 
over land. 
In many African countries, attempts have been made to incorporate those holding 
land under customary systems under the ‘modern’ system, for example by making 
it mandatory to register land holdings and land transactions under the formal, 
centralized system. However, these have not succeeded, as the associated ﬁnancial 
and transaction costs are great, and the beneﬁts are often unclear. As a result, 
in most countries there are multiple and often overlapping land tenure systems, 
customary and modern. This often produces a situation of legal uncertainty. 
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claiming under statutory law. In many situations, individuals will use whichever 
system suits them in order to gain access to land, a phenomenon known as ‘forum 
shopping’. The long-term effect of ‘forum-shopping’ is the undermining of 
traditional systems. 
Hernando de Soto has famously argued that the key to unlocking the potential of 
the developing world lies bridging the gap between informal and formal property 
rights, in order to unlock the potential capital available through loans, fungibility 
of assets, and other means.17 De Soto’s projection may be overly optimistic - it is 
perhaps unlikely that formalizing the ownership of a typical poor rural dwelling 
in Burundi, for example, and the half-hectare plot that surrounds it, will bring 
miraculous beneﬁts to the owner (s/he may not be willing and able to offer it as 
collateral, and a bank may not lend on it at useful rates). However, the principle 
is generally important: in order to bring improved tenure security, the state must 
not simply impose an idealistic de jure system, but rather start with the de facto 
reality, where:
 “property is used and protected by all sorts of extralegal arrangements ﬁrmly 
rooted in informal consensus dispersed through large areas… Creating one 
national social contract on property involves understanding the psychological and 
social processes – the beliefs, desires, intentions, customs and rules – that are 
contained in these local social contracts and then using the tools that professional 
law provides to weave them into one formal national social contract.” 
This approach – essentially an ‘adaptation paradigm’ of incremental change -
- has been advocated for by African and Africanist scholars for many years.18 
In practice however, Western land tenure models have often been imported to 
Africa wholesale. While appropriate in formal urban contexts (though not in 
informal settlements), they simply do not fulﬁll the current needs of the majority 
in rural areas. Individualization of tenure, cadastral systems and land titling and 
registration can lead to confusion and create more uncertainty in a land tenure 
system than existed before these processes were implemented.19 In some cases, 
the mere announcement of future land titling programmes can re-activate old 
disputes, lead to new disputes, and alter the ways in which land disputes are 
managed.20
In the most extreme cases of corruption and misrule, applying for land title can 
actually be more risky than remaining without it, dependent on custom or even 
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tolerated use. This is because once the application in the hands of those in the 
land administration, it may be a target for ‘land grabbing’, for example by double 
registration. At its most extreme, for example in the so-called ‘kleptocracy’ 
period of Mobutu’s rule, one might legitimately speak of a state-sponsored 
‘informalization’ of land tenure (through contradictory and retrogressive policies) 
in order to facilitate the process of land acquisition by favoured people.21
In situations where the administrative systems are more trustworthy, the likelihood 
of some resources users ‘losing out’ is still high. Factors such as great disparity 
in levels of education and differential access to state administrative organs (by 
geographical marginalisation or even due to class or ethnic discrimination) allow 
elites to ‘work the system’ to their advantage.22
In response to such problems, a number of countries have taken a different 
approach, and developed policies and laws in which either the land administration 
systems, the rights which are administered by these systems, or both of these 
things, are composed of different elements from different normative models.23 In 
most cases, the emphasis of these changes is on moving the focus away from the 
central state as the owner and administrator of land, and onto local administrative 
units or communities. Decentralization of responsibility is therefore one important 
element. Customary rights are receiving unprecedented levels of attention from 
policy-makers, with considerable effort being made to recognize forms of 
communal land control, for example. 
The proposed changes to the Land Code in Burundi include elements which may 
represent some moved towards an adaptive model. For example, the currently 
informal Certiﬁcate de Possession, which is essentially an agreement between 
seller and buyer, endorsed by a local authority, will be given legal recognition. This 
may bring increased security of tenure at local level – experience from Rwanda 
suggests that farmers do not necessarily require full title (e.g. the type required 
to use land as collateral) but rather require protection from expropriation by the 
state or competing land claims by neighbours and family-members.24 This can be 
provided to a degree by a deeds-style system along the lines of the Certiﬁcate de 
Possession, as long as corruption at the local level can be controlled.
In DRC, despite a land law that does not recognize customary rights, some 
elements of custom have remained very inﬂuential at local level. When these 
customs have been ignored, the result has been rejection of claims to land.  In 
the eyes of local people, the ‘right’ to allocate land – or at least to be consulted 
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before land distribution - belongs to them, through their customary leaders.25 In 
order to avoid possible conﬂicts over land, an individual or group seeking to be 
granted a lease to a particular area, even a ‘vacant’ area, will typically consult 
the chief and the elders of the locality before applying to the Province. During 
local consultations, the local elders and inﬂuential people will be informed of 
the intended uses of the land, and will be requested to grant permission. A gift 
– largely symbolic – will be offered to the chief and elders, often consisting of a 
cow or goat, which may be slaughtered and eaten during the discussions. 
This custom is reﬂected in the land legislation, which provides that when an 
application for lease of ‘vacant’ rural land is made, the authorities place a large 
advertisement: 
“…with the aim of protecting the rights of traditional populations. The posting of 
a notice authorising this research needs to be done in the locality where the site 
is situated. The research should include the census of the people who are there or 
who are participating in any activity, as well as an interview with the people to 
hear their complaints and observations.” 26
Clearly, this does not provide local people with the right to veto the purchase. 
However, local practicalities often preclude strict application of the law. The 
Registrar of Land Titles for Bunia District stated that during the ‘survey’ of the 
land prior to a title being issued, the local people essentially had a de facto right 
of veto over the acquisition process. ‘If the elders refuse, you can’t do anything’. 
Other surveys have also conﬁrmed that in practice, access ﬁrst has to be granted 
by customary leaders before state leases can be issued.27 The local people have an 
informal ‘management’ right, known colloquially as the droit de regard. This then 
suggests that the relationships between local people and their chiefs are crucial. 
Indeed, the Registrar implicated the local chiefs in several of the contentious land 
disputes. In an example from Komanda town, Irumu District, South-West of Bunia 
town, local people, and sources in related that the former chief de collectivite had, 
before the war, distributed land as a concession to a Hema individual, but that 
local people had not been happy with the decision.28 They stated that the chief 
de collectivite had ‘liked cows too much’, suggesting that most if not all of any 
beneﬁt to local people had in fact accrued to him. Before the conﬂict, there had 
been a series of court battles to overturn the Hema man’s title to the plot, but all 
had been unsuccessful. This conﬁrms that despite legislation and state rhetoric 
limiting the powers of the chiefs, they remained highly important players in the 
political economy of land. In Ituri, as elsewhere, the land issue pivots around the 
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nature of relationships between local communities, their chiefs, local elites, and 
political and technical state functionaries.
Some former government ofﬁcials argue correctly that the 1973 law and the 1980 
modiﬁcations are the only regulations governing land leasing in DRC, and the 
chiefs should not therefore have such a role. However, despite this ofﬁcial position, 
it seems that they are also aware of the importance of local custom. A former 
Provincial Governor, after initially denying that the right to veto or droit de regard 
existed, later conﬁrmed its importance asked about land issues in Bas Congo, 
where inheritance runs through the maternal line, “and all of the aunt’s sons have 
the droit de regard”.29 While in the eyes of the law, such local rights may seem like 
outdated custom, with no legal basis, the history of land management in Africa 
and across the world is replete with examples that prove that such customs cannot 
simply be ‘legislated away’. For changes to occur in practice, legislation has to be 
accompanied by local consultations, awareness-raising campaigns, and effective 
implementation of legal provisions by staff who are sympathetic to local attitudes 
but also rigorous in their application of the law. Most importantly of course, in 
order to be followed, legislation must be designed in order to be practical and 
responsive to local needs, and build upon existing realities.
Historical Injustices and Land Disputes
In a number of African countries, particularly but not exclusively in the South of 
the continent, the colonial experience involved great disruption not just in terms 
of the imposition of Western models of land use, which differed radically from 
indigenous norms and values; but also direct expropriation of land. This was most 
obviously the case in Zimbabwe (where Europeans controlled at least half of 
the entire land area), Kenya, and South Africa (where indigenous Africans were 
moved from prime land into ‘bantustans’ on low-potential soils), and numerous 
other cases can be cited, including Nigeria, Malawi, Namibia, and Angola. In other 
areas, such as Eastern DRC, colonial powers encouraged, facilitated or forced 
Africans to relocate from their home areas to other places in order to provide 
labour on plantations or to set up smallholder systems of cash-crop production. 
As many of these immigrants originated from neighbouring Rwanda, they have 
found their land rights, and their citizenship, questioned since independence, 
and this has been a major factor in the conﬂicts there. If the citizenship question 
related to Kinyarwanda- and Kirundi-speaking communities in Eastern DRC is 
not fully resolved, it will be difﬁcult to achieve long-term peace in the area.
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In Kenya, Zimbabwe, and South Africa, a combination of colonial policies on 
land tenure and agricultural production led to the ‘hacienda’ or estate becoming 
the predominant form of capitalist production.30 In the process of land alienation, 
some communities were affected more than others, and indeed some communities 
were dispossessed not only of their land but also their identity, as they were not 
recognized as autonomous communities.31 Other communities such as the Twa, 
while being recognized as a group, have been systematically marginalized since 
colonial times and have lost access to land in DRC, Rwanda, and in Burundi, 
where about 53 per cent of the Batwa are landless.32
During the independence struggles (many of which, such as that waged by the 
‘Mau Mau’ or Kenya Land and Freedom Army, were focused on restitution of lost 
lands), much of the anti-colonial violence was played out between those ﬁghting 
for liberation and those working for the colonial government or for colonial 
farmers. The colonialists were adept at maintaining African forces as a ‘buffer’ 
between themselves and the liberation forces. This had the effect of dividing 
African communities, especially in cases where particular identity groups tended 
to dominate colonial security forces. They became associated with repression, 
and these associations may not have been quick to fade after independence.
In some cases, as independence approached, colonial authorities entrenched not 
only European property rights, but also those of the small African elite, in order 
to encourage continuity in political direction and land ownership patterns.33 In 
Kenya for example, consecutive post-independence governments failed to address 
historical injustices over land, and treated land primarily as an economic good, 
rather than treating it in a holistic manner.34 In a great number of countries, land 
has been an important currency in the politics of ‘(neo)patrimonialism’, whereby 
politics is based on patron-client relations, maintained through the informal 
supply of goods and services by political patrons to their supporters.35 In many 
countries, the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, and the Structural Adjustment 
Programmes introduced soon after by the World Bank and IMF, reduced the 
external resources available for circulation in (neo)patrimonial systems, hence 
increasing the importance of local resources, such as land. This led to corruption 
within land administration systems and precluded the effective resolution of 
injustices over land. Land disputes and conﬂicts which originated due to colonial 
policies and liberation conﬂicts therefore continue to plague some countries to 
date.
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Evidence from Ituri Territory in North-eastern DRC, which has been affected 
by violence between Hema and Lendu communities, as well as other groups, 
suggests that contemporary conﬂicts cannot be understood from a perspective 
that fails to include a strong historical dimension. Anthropological data suggests 
that controversies over land access existed before the colonial period. 36 However, 
the abundance of lands (in a situation of low population numbers) meant that 
these did not result in violence at the time.37 However, there were evidently some 
tensions between the two groups, and a number of violent incidents occurred in 
the late 19th century and continued into the early 20th century.38
The treatment of the different groups under colonialism is the subject of some 
debate. Many observers argue that the Belgians favoured the Hema rather than 
the Lendu, perceiving the monarchical system and pastoralist lifestyle of the 
former as inherently ‘superior’ to the more segmented and agricultural society 
of the latter.39 The vast majority of Lendu continued to rely exclusively on 
smallholder agriculture or provided cheap labour in the mining centers, and did 
not participate as actors in such networks of economic expansion. Members of the 
Hema community came to form the majority of the educated people in the district, 
tended to gain many administrative positions and also invested their cattle-based 
wealth in the vehicles, buildings and other investments necessary for commerce 
and trade. This tendency has come to represent an urban-rural divide between 
Hema and Lendu, and the desire of some Hema leaders for exclusive control of 
Bunia after 1999 represents the extreme nadir of this pattern.40  
In the post-independence period, there is evidence that pastoral land, in some 
areas, was expanded at the expense of agricultural land.41 During the 1960s, and 
at points during every decade thereafter, Lendu and Hema communities were 
involved in clashes over ﬁshing and land rights. These were mostly addressed 
by customary leaders, though in 1993, troops were sent in to quell the violence. 
Predictably perhaps, they fought ﬁre with ﬁre, turning heavy artillery on Lendu 
villages.42
The early 1980s saw another change to existing land use patterns. The Bureau 
du Projet Ituri (BPI), a development project funded by international donors, 
sought to improve pastoral productivity, in part by delineating areas across the 
entire district as either ‘pastoral’ or ‘agricultural’ lands. BPI documents suggest 
that in many places, the delineation exercise was unproblematic, but in certain 
areas – for example, in the collectivity of the Lendu-Bindi, in Irumu – there was 
resistance to the exercise from cultivators.43 The BPI urged the government cadres 
to put pressure (faissent pression) on the customary authorities, and to use their 
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inﬂuence on the agricultural population, to ensure that the exercise went ahead. 
The BPI certainly reﬂected a more general trend of ‘top-down’ governance within 
the country.
Djugu, the area in Ituri where conﬂict ﬁrst erupted in 1999, is inhabited 
predominantly by the Gegere (generally known as the ‘Northern Hema’) and 
the Lendu (of which there are several local sub-groups), and is the most densely 
populated territory in Ituri. The fact that this was the area where large-scale 
conﬂict ﬁrst broke out in 1999 ﬁts with the theoretical rule-of-thumb that where 
population density is greater, boundaries are stricter with fewer ‘buffer areas’ to 
provide ﬂexibility, and disputes more likely.44
There are a number of large colonial-era ranching and farming concessions 
located in Djugu. During the ‘Zairianisation’ process, which involved the 
handover of foreign-owned assets to Congolese, several Hema were reportedly 
granted ownership of the concessions. They were, because of the importance of 
Hema traders and politicians, inﬂuential within the Mobutu regime and able to 
take advantage of the networks of patronage and favouritism, in a similar fashion 
to many other ethnic communities during this period. A considerable amount of 
land was also owned by the church. The perception of some informants is that 
the church is also a Hema-dominated institution, and when church land was sold, 
Hema were given priority in purchasing it.45 Of course, as they formed the majority 
of the trading and administrative class, members of the Hema community would 
be among the few locals with the necessary access to funds to purchase land, 
whether church-owned or otherwise.
According to most accounts, the main conﬂict surrounded the expansion of 
the concession borders. Another type of dispute could arise when colonial-
era concessions were passing into the hands of Congolese owners, after being 
abandoned for some time: local chiefs and communities often assumed that 
ownership had reverted to them, whereas by law, it was still under the control of 
the state.46 Another typical scenario involved the purchase of ‘vacant’ land, which, 
as described in the sections above, was an ambiguous category, due to the failure 
of the land law to deﬁne it adequately. In the words of one respondent, ‘the state, 
the chiefs, the people – they all think that they own the land!’47
During the intense violence – during which some 50,000 people died in Ituri and 
half a million were displaced – large areas have been ethnically cleansed. However, 
in practice, communities need to trade with each other as the economy and food 
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security of the area depends upon symbiosis between agricultural commodities 
and livestock. Local markets are the practical focus for local peace-making 
agreements. In the Irumu District of Ituri, for example, certain areas have no 
livestock, which forces them to make access agreements with opposing groups in 
order to buy meat and milk. These spontaneous agreements should be supported, 
not just by NGO efforts to reconstruct market facilities and roads, but also by the 
United Nations Mission for the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC)  in 
terms of security arrangements.
2. Land Rights During Conﬂict
Situations of violent conﬂict, though often different in character and cause, tend to 
have a universally acute impact on the land rights of civilians. It is well-established 
that in modern conﬂicts, 75-90 per cent of the casualties are civilians. Through 
political mobilization, use of economic incentives, activation of patrimonial 
networks and coercion, political and military leaders – often best described as 
‘political entrepreneurs’ – manage to involve civilians in violence, and in Africa, 
speciﬁc personalities and movements become associated with entire ethnic groups. 
In turn, civilians belonging to these ethnic groups bear the brunt of violence.  
Population Displacement During Conﬂict
For this reason, large-scale population displacement is a feature of many African 
conﬂicts. Africa constitutes only 12 per cent of the global population; however, 
28 per cent of the world’s refugees and just fewer than half of the 20m internally 
displaced people are found in Africa.48 Both IDPs and refugees need assistance 
to resume their normal lives, and often require protection to ensure their physical 
security. While refugees receive considerable aid from UNHCR and other bodies, 
IDPs often remain at the mercy of the very regimes or non-state actors that have 
caused their plight. In 1951, the United Nations adopted the Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees, a legally binding treaty that, by February 2002, had 
been ratiﬁed by 140 countries. Internal displacement does not have an equivalent 
legally binding treaty.
However, the intense international advocacy efforts which have been made on 
behalf of IDPs in recent years have led to increasing awareness of these issues. 
The magnitude of the challenge represented by the phenomenon is evident in the 
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appointment of Dr. Francis  Deng in 1992 as Representative of the UN Secretary-
General on Internally Displaced Persons, and the development of the 1998 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. The guiding principles emphasize 
the right of IDPs to participate in planning and distributing relief supplies and in 
managing their return home and reintegration. The Guiding Principles, which are 
non-binding, have been incorporated into national legislation in Angola and are 
in the process of being integrated into Ugandan law.49 These examples should be 
followed in other African countries, and supported by local by-laws, training, and 
information dissemination as necessary.
The reasons for displacement are multiple, and include not just the threat of attack, 
but also the deprivation and risk of hunger that comes with the loss of access to 
market, destruction of crops, and damage to the social fabric of societies. This 
suggests that whenever possible, peacekeeping forces should protect markets, 
trade routes, and property rights.
In many cases, population displacement is not an accidental outcome, but rather a 
strategy pursued by those engaged in war, in order to achieve ‘ethnic cleansing’. 
In Eastern DRC, for example, entire communities have been forced from their 
villages and many houses have been burnt down. In the words of one local woman, 
the message is clear: “it means they don’t want us to come back!”50 Such actions 
may or may not be sanctioned by leaders, and may be carried out by ‘civilians’ as 
well as combatants. Conﬂict situations are always confusing, ﬂuid and chaotic – 
in remote and marginalized areas, where the rule of law may never have been fully 
established, there is a particular risk that during periods of conﬂict, people will 
opportunistically attempt to seize land and property, or settle ongoing disputes. 
One in-depth study of local level land access in Northwestern Rwanda provides 
a chilling account of this phenomenon.51 In one particular commune in Gisenyi 
Province, land disputes were becoming more and more numerous in the years 
leading up to the 1994 genocide. Customary conﬂict mediators reported that about 
half of all the disputes being referred to them were over land, particularly over 
inheritance. Because of the sheer extent of land scarcity, many of these conﬂicts 
could not be resolved satisfactorily. In this particular commune, 32 people of 
a total population of 596 were murdered during the genocide period. Of these, 
only one was a Tutsi – she was the only Tutsi in the vicinity and the ﬁrst to be 
murdered. According to researchers, the rest tended to be people who were not 
socially accepted or those who were resented by some people because they had 
large landholdings (in addition to those who were militia members and therefore 
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would have been directly involved in military conﬂict). This then represents a 
tragic, if typical feature of civil wars – the tendency for some local people to use 
the cover of confusion in order to ‘settle old scores’, many of which originate in 
social struggles for access to land. 
In some cases civilians ﬂee the conﬂict-area or the entire country, abandoning their 
homes: Rwanda and Burundi for example, have experienced multiple waves of 
displacement, with large proportions of the population residing in exile for years, 
or even decades. In other cases, people run to safer areas, but return regularly to 
cultivate their ﬁelds or try to maintain their property rights. In Northern Uganda, 
for example, large number of families operate as so-called ‘night commuters’, 
farming during the day but leaving for towns and army camps at dusk. Globally, 
there are currently 12 million registered refugees, and between 20 and 25 million 
internally displaced persons.52 
Often, population displacement itself is a factor in future conﬂict. A great number 
of violent conﬂicts (including those in Rwanda and Burundi, for example) have 
involved members of exiled communities, often through cross-border raids. 
Frequently, an important aspect in this dynamic has been the ill-treatment and 
scapegoating of the refugees in the country of asylum – the treatment of Rwandans 
in Uganda, particularly under Idi Amin, is a case-in-point.53 This suggests that 
defending the rights and livelihood options of refugees in a host country, and 
moving towards integration of those refugees into nation economic and social life, 
may help to reduce the risk of conﬂict in certain situations.
Land as a Sustaining Factor in Conﬂict
During conﬂicts, land is controlled and distributed by those with the military 
and political capacities to do so, in order to sustain conﬂict or achieve conﬂict-
related ends. During chronic low-intensity conﬂict – which is arguably the most 
common form of warfare in Africa – the state may continue to carry out many 
of its functions, including land administration, but its capacity will typically be 
limited due to loss of human resources (through death, recruitment, or ﬂight), 
loss of revenue, and lack of political will. Given this context, land policies (where 
they exist) will rarely be followed.54 In areas which are not under state control, 
alternative ‘policies’ may even be put in place by rebel groups, or communities 
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which ﬁnd themselves operating in an institutional vacuum, and hence relying on 
custom, negotiation, and occasional use of force. In Ituri Territory for example, 
a coalition of local elites and the Uganda People’s Defense Forces (UPDF) was 
able to use force to decide disputes over land, which generally had an ethnic 
dimension. Ituri Territory, which was under the control of the commander of 
the UPDF in the DRC, was ‘unilaterally’ promoted to the status of a Province, 
and a Gegere businesswoman, Adele Lotsove, was appointed as Governor. The 
UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other 
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo heard evidence to 
suggest that she  ‘contributed to the reallocation of land from Lendus to Hemas’.55 
In some countries – in the Balkans for example – land laws have been passed 
during conﬂict to ‘legalize’ discriminatory land activities. After conﬂict has 
abated, one of the ﬁrst tasks for the transitional authorities has been to abolish 
these discriminatory laws. In DRC, it was hardly necessary for wartime elites 
to pass new laws, given the loopholes already existing in the law, the amount 
of personalized power available to those in political control, and the levels of 
corruption within the land administration.
Alternatively, occupation of land and settlement during conﬂict may be inﬂuenced 
by the actual or perceived availability of relief aid. Indeed, international aid efforts 
are often manipulated by warring parties to their own advantage. In southern Sudan 
for example, whole communities have been forced or encourage to temporarily 
move in order to attract relief to a particular area, so that political entrepreneurs 
can beneﬁt directly (through theft of relief items) or indirectly (through resulting 
political capital).
In North Kivu Province of Eastern DRC for example, since 1996, land has also 
shifted from a source of conﬂict, into a ‘resource’ used for the perpetuation of 
war.  The most visible illustration is the conﬁscation by local commanders of land 
that they cannot legally claim.  The example of Masisi District demonstrates the 
importance of land for the consolidation of alternative power structures. While 
the military campaigns of ‘rebel’ groups in 1996 and from 1998 advantaged the 
local Banyarwanda elites in their claims to land, the same land has become one 
of the crucial assets around which a new local power complex under control of 
the Banyarwanda elite has been constructed. This power complex offers a good 
example of how local elites have instrumentalised a context of state decline and 
conﬂict and have combined foreign and national support networks for their local 
interests.  Access to land, in the case of Masisi, has several functions.  It provides 
this new complex with the necessary economic basis, yet at the same time helps 
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to consolidate the support of the grassroots population, which in return is granted 
access to land.  The informal governance structure that has emerged from the 
unequal resource attribution –and which include both military and political 
elements, foreign and local actors – has laid the basis for a further reinforcement 
of ethnic boundaries, as this structure is based on processes of inclusion and 
exclusion. 
Land Rights of Women, Children and Marginalized Communities
In many parts of Africa, as elsewhere in the world, women lack equitable access 
to and control over land, due to the nature of customary regimes, limited access 
to education and cash, and other reasons. Most of the customary systems are 
patriarchal, where land is passed down generations through the male lineage. 
Women cannot therefore own land, although they have access to it depending 
on their relationship to the male owner, e.g., wife or daughter. Often, customary 
regimes that do provide some access to land, however insecure, are being 
undermined by land scarcity and the commodiﬁcation of land. Individualization 
and registration of land often adds to the level of justice because the male head of 
household generally gains title.
The existing inequalities are often exacerbated during conﬂict. In Burundi for 
example, more than 44 per cent of households in the displacement camps are 
female-headed, due to widowhood, single parenthood often as a result of rape, 
or separation and divorce as families fail to cope with the challenges of life in 
displacement.56 As in most African contexts where land ownership is based on 
patriarchal inheritance systems, women and widows are easily dispossessed, as 
male relatives demand that the women give up land upon the husband’s death. 
Upon death or separation, many households now suffer reduced access to land, 
because identifying potential lands for cultivation and negotiating is traditionally 
a male role.57 Finding land is particularly difﬁcult for older widows who moved 
away from their home areas many years ago to be with their husbands. On 
returning to their home areas, relatives may not be found there, due to death or 
displacement; often they may be refused land.58
Women in camps have reduced access to land compared to the access they enjoyed 
before displacement. Alternatives to cultivation for a largely illiterate population 
are severely limited. Those who seek non-farm opportunities are often separated 
from their partners for long periods, which also lead to increased risk of HIV-
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infection as they seek new partners or are forced into the commercial sex trade. 
In Burundi, Article 17 of the Constitutional Act of Transition establishes the 
equality of men and women before the law, and the 1993 amendment of the code 
of the Person and the Family includes the right to joint management of family 
property granted to women and to the wife if the husband is absent. In practice 
however, women’s rights are still limited, as most men tend to delegate land 
matters to their male relatives. Matrimonial arrangements, succession, legacies 
and gifts are all governed by customary law, which does not fully recognize 
women’s land rights.59  
Despite limited access to land, women are nonetheless expected to provide food 
and keep the families going in conﬂict situations, when their partners abandon 
them or go to ﬁght.60 Non-observance of women’s property rights in spite of 
these responsibilities could breed resentment and apathy, and determine the 
role of women in post-conﬂict reconstruction and reconciliation. For instance, 
dispossessed women who do not ﬁnd viable redress may support warring parties 
by providing food, money, clothes or indirect support by maintaining secrecy over 
their whereabouts, political support or information in the hope that when they come 
to power, they will address these grievances. Furthermore, they may be willing 
to ‘donate’ their sons to the war effort, especially when armed groups promise 
land as a prize for such sacriﬁce. Without an alternative source of income, women 
may send their sons to join armed groups, from where they support themselves 
through looting. 
Sometimes, the changing responsibilities and socio-economic roles of women can 
be acknowledged at the family, community and national levels, therefore leading 
to an improvement in women’s abilities to participate in governance of land and 
natural resources in the post-conﬂict context. For example, in Liberia, the Liberia 
Women Initiative was heavily involved in the peace process and maintained 
inﬂuence thereafter.61 In Rwanda too, there has been much post-conﬂict political 
will for women to gain important political and socio-economic positions, partly as 
a realization that women shouldered a huge burden due to the number of husbands 
and fathers killed during the war and genocide, and the great number of male 
prisoners awaiting trial. 
Sadly, however, a more typical story has been that of Eritrea, where the 
responsibilities and experience gained by women – who played a massive role 
in the victory of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front – have since the end of 
the war been denied them. Socio-cultural factors relating to gender stereotypes 
have prevented women from continuing to play a major role in society. This 
demonstrates that women’s rights to land and decision-making powers cannot be 
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guaranteed merely by legal means, but only through a combination of political 
will, social change, awareness raising, and relentless lobbying and advocacy.
Rwanda is an example of a post-conﬂict country that has developed progressive 
legislation to improve women’s rights to inherit land and other property. However, 
there are customary barriers to implementation, as many men believe that the law 
is unjust as women will then be able to beneﬁt from land from two sources: her 
parents, and her husband.62 Even some women believe that only a woman who 
is single or separated from her husband should claim land through inheritance, 
because of the extent of land scarcity.63 
In Rwanda, access to land for women is often dependent on subjective community 
perceptions of their ‘virtue’, as judged against ideals of female behaviour. In 
addition to customary norms, Christian narratives have also been inﬂuential 
in shaping local perceptions of the secondary status of women.64 In some 
cases, female survivors have been stigmatised due to alleged or actual sexual 
relations (including rape) between them and those who hid them or helped them 
to escape the genocide; the situation is particularly traumatising for them.65 
District administrators mentioned that the ‘coping strategies’ employed by those 
affected by landlessness included prostitution, due to the lack of other non-farm 
opportunities.66 This is likely to establish a vicious cycle, where those judged 
‘unworthy’ of gaining land then turn to ‘unworthy’ occupations: a self-fulﬁlling 
prophecy.
Interviews with local administrators in rural areas – who tend to be aware of 
the inheritance law - suggest that some women are retroactively claiming their 
rights, which were denied in past inheritance cases.67 The same administrators 
also state that with the extra pressure on the land represented by the entry of 
women as legitimate inheritors of family land, the ban on sub-division of plots 
smaller than 2 hectares will be impossible to enforce.68 Finally, while awareness 
of the law amongst ofﬁcials is high, it seems that a large proportion of the general 
population may not be fully aware of the provisions of the law.69
Clearly, gender-based inequalities cannot merely be ‘legislated away’.  Customary 
attitudes and the pragmatic approaches of local administrators – who often 
combine statutory and customary law in their decisions--will determine how the 
law is implemented. In order for the inheritance law to be effective, the ‘top-
down’ mindset which sometimes dominates the policy-making arena will have to 
be tempered by awareness of local realities. Monitoring of the implementation of 
the law, by researchers who have experience in gender issues and are aware of the 
Rwandan gender ‘narratives’ (including the effects of the war and genocide on 
these), will be essential in order for it to have a positive impact. In addition, the 
high-proﬁle gender equality campaign – which is highly effective in underpinning 
urban, middle-class rights – may not be as effective at the level of the colline (hill, 
equivalent to a rural neighbourhood), and a multi-dimensional approach to gender 
inequalities is necessary.
3. Land Access in the Post-Conﬂict Context
Land rights, along with related issues such as housing needs for homeless and other 
vulnerable populations, are key issues in post-conﬂict reconstruction. However, 
they are not always addressed in a comprehensive way due to the complexity 
of the factors involved, and political sensitivities. Nevertheless, there is growing 
awareness that land rights and related issues must be addressed not merely as a 
‘development’ issue, years after the ofﬁcial end of hostilities, but actually during 
the ‘emergency’ phase, to the extent possible. FAO and several UN agencies 
(including UNHCR and UN-HABITAT) are currently developing guidelines and 
policies based on this understanding.70 Key issues include broadening the mandate 
of peace-keeping forces to include protection of property rights; conducting 
research on related issues in order to prepare for eventual action, and identifying 
local and international personnel in order to plan for implementation.
A number of issues are signiﬁcant when considering land issues in post-conﬂict 
situations, including: the inequities posed by gender issues, as widowed women 
and orphaned children tend to face increased responsibilities as heads-of-household 
but lack access to land; the return of refugees and internally displaced people, often 
without titles or other proof of ownership; the status of environmentally sensitive 
areas, especially where there is land pressure due to sudden refugee returns; the 
threat of landmines and unexploded ordinance in some areas; and the need for 
management of local inter-communal relations where civilian populations have 
often been the victims of violence, and where land claims have an inherently 
‘communal’ nature. Despite all these problems, it is often recommended that 
some elements of post-conﬂict land reform are done rapidly – or even built-into 
peace negotiations – in order to avoid problematic issues ‘festering’ over time and 
triggering more conﬂict at a later date.71
However, the transition between ‘conﬂict’ and ‘post-conﬂict’ is never clear. In 
terms of the causes of violence, conﬂict may never be fully resolved; in terms of 
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guaranteed merely by legal means, but only through a combination of political 
will, social change, awareness raising, and relentless lobbying and advocacy.
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the violence itself, it may continue sporadically well past the ofﬁcial declaration 
of ‘peace’.72 Certain areas may be particularly affected, and indeed may not come 
under the control of the post-conﬂict government for months, or years. This is 
especially true in Africa, where remote areas are inaccessible due to lack of 
infrastructure.
Another issue of particular relevance in situations where transitional governments 
incorporate former belligerents, who remain divided in terms of the national vision 
and development objectives. A common situation involves former military or 
political leaders being given control of particular ministries or institutions under 
the terms of a peace agreement. This leads to differing objectives in government 
being reﬂected by inter-ministerial struggles. 
In Burundi for example, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement provides 
for the establishment of institutions to facilitate repatriation and reintegration of 
refugees and related concerns towards a post-conﬂict dispensation. The National 
Commission for Rehabilitation of Victims of War (Commission Nationale de 
Réhabilitation des Sinistrés, CNRS), was thus formed, ﬁrst as an autonomous 
agency with decision-making powers, but later subsumed under the Ministry of 
Resettlement and Reinsertion of IDPs and Repatriates (MRRDR).  CNRS was 
established in February 2003 to replace the National Repatriation Commission, 
and is to work alongside other institutions including the Sub Commission on 
Land Issues, the National Fund for Sinistrés and Reception Committees of local 
authorities and security agents. Its institutional set-up is a result of a compromise 
between the dominant political parties, Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi 
(FRODEBU) and the group of ten (G10) parties that are associated with Tutsi 
interests. Frederick Bamvuginyumvira of FRODEBU (a Hutu-dominated party) 
chairs the Commission, which is under the institutional ‘guardianship’ of the 
MRRDR, which is headed by a minister from the Tutsi-dominated Inkizo party. 
The strength of CNRS lies in the fact that it is a product of the Arusha Agreement 
and as such, enjoys some legitimacy and recognition by the signatories. Despite 
ﬁnancial and logistical constraints, it has made signiﬁcant inroads into addressing 
the short-term needs of IDPs in some parts of the country. 
However, it has a number of potential weaknesses, most importantly its loss 
of autonomy, as its ﬁnancial and administrative capacity was placed under the 
MRRDR. This greatly hampers its effectiveness, especially because its mandate 
conﬂicts or overlaps with that of the ministry. Indeed, the Commission established 
to monitor implementation of the Arusha Accords sees this political compromise 
as a breach of the spirit of the Accords.73 Some internal relationships within 
CNRS are also problematic. Given these dynamics, CNRS lacks the support and 
good will of some political parties, which perceive elements of its leadership 
as politically partisan. For instance, analysts have questioned the selection of a 
Tutsi army ofﬁcer as head of the sub-commission on land, arguing that it does not 
bode well for an impartial and de-politicized process.74 Moreover, the manner of 
appointment of some members of CNRS leaves a lot to be desired, as it appears 
professional competence was not a signiﬁcant criterion of selection; as some of 
them may have bought cards of political parties just to get through to the CNRS, 
where they stood to earn a salary equal to that paid for the CSA’s members.75 
Repatriation and Restitution of Property after Conﬂict
Restitution of property to repatriated refugees and returning IDPs is widely 
acknowledged as a vital issue, and has been built into peace agreements for 
Rwanda (in 1993) and Burundi (in 2000), for example. However, it is a politically 
difﬁcult issue to address at a regional or global level. For example, efforts to 
develop global norms or conventions linking restitution with the return of refugees 
– guaranteeing property rights as a condition for return – are controversial. A 
number of states feel that this may become a sticking point in future repatriations, 
and both hosting nations and some refugee-generating countries are keen to 
repatriate refugees speedily, for a variety of reasons (economic burdens, security 
issues, and environmental impacts are often cited).
The signing of the peace agreement (the Pretoria Protocol) between the Transitional 
Government of Burundi and the rebel group CNDD-FDD in October 2003 was 
seen to be the deﬁning moment for ending armed hostilities, hence signaling 
a return to peace and the long-awaited repatriation of refugees and internally 
displaced persons to their country or homes.
However, there is a risk that the fragile peace currently being enjoyed in Burundi 
could be undermined by inadequate preparation to receive returning refugees, 
or ineffective and weak institutions for addressing land disputes, in the context 
of manipulation of grievances for political purposes. Unfortunately, there is a 
precedent for such a situation: in 1993, the ﬁrst democratically elected president, 
a Hutu, embarked on a series of reforms soon after his election victory. He was 
sympathetic to the land claims of refugees, which threatened the interests of 
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of autonomy, as its ﬁnancial and administrative capacity was placed under the 
MRRDR. This greatly hampers its effectiveness, especially because its mandate 
conﬂicts or overlaps with that of the ministry. Indeed, the Commission established 
to monitor implementation of the Arusha Accords sees this political compromise 
as a breach of the spirit of the Accords.73 Some internal relationships within 
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powerful landowners. Land disputes related to the return of refugees signiﬁcantly 
contributed to the deterioration of the political situation that culminated in a coup 
d’état and the assassination of the president.76
In Burundi, the issues involved in securing land and livelihoods rights for refugees 
and the displaced differ from case to case. For example, a signiﬁcant number of 
refugees were landless before their departure from Burundi. Research in nine 
provinces by Ligue ITEKA, funded by UNHCR, indicates that about 17 per cent 
of returnees were in this category.77 
It is particularly important to note that there are substantial differences between 
those who have been living in exile or have been displaced for a relatively short 
period – e.g. since 1993 or more recently – and those who left their hill in 1972, for 
example.   Particularly in the case of the 1993 caseload, regaining access to their 
land may not be difﬁcult. This is why most experts believe that some 90 per cent 
of land disputes are considered to be small, local, intra-family disputes which can 
be resolved without signiﬁcant external (e.g. central government) intervention.78 
Nevertheless, even at this level, non-state intervention is necessary to prevent 
their exploitation by local politicians out to fuel ethnic conﬂict. Since 2001, some 
NGOs have initiated, in different parts of the country, mobile legal clinics in order 
to manage these infra-family conﬂicts.79
People who have been away from their lands for longer will have greater difﬁculty 
in gaining access to land. This applies especially to those who ﬂed the country 
in 1972.80 This implies a regional differentiation in the nature and severity of 
problems, as many 1972 refugees originate from the south of the country.81 The 
situation of the long term refugees is particularly delicate because their land, 
especially that located in the fertile Imbo plains, was conﬁscated ‘virtually 
systematically’ by the government.82 The expropriated land is now in the hands 
of other owners, who have a legitimate claim to it since they were issued with 
title deeds – in some cases, land may have changed hands several times. Other 
land was taken over by relatives, friends, neighbours or may have been resold. In 
some cases, relatives have subdivided or sold the land, and are now discouraging 
refugees from returning, through sending messages to the camps that security 
remains poor.83 This demonstrates the importance of ensuring that refugees have 
access to impartial information from various sources, including information-
gathering visits by refugees themselves.
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Support for Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
Land disputes after conﬂict are often numerous, complex, and politically sensitive. 
Often, land records – where they exist- are destroyed or stolen by combatants, in 
order to undermine attempts to reconstruct the country. Those dispute resolution 
mechanisms which exist should be supported in various ways (e.g. logistically, 
technically, and politically). These will often exist at the local level, and indeed 
in countries such as DRC, Burundi and Rwanda, the main proof of land rights 
in rural areas tends to be oral testimony from respected neighbours and local 
leaders. Because such local institutions tend to have an inﬂuence on multiple 
sectors – including environmental issues such as communal grazing or woodland 
areas – supporting them may have knock-on effects on environmental governance 
more generally.  However, support requires a well-informed approach because of 
the potentials for bias in decision-making.
In Burundi, as noted elsewhere, land belonging to refugees that has been left for 
many years has eventually fallen into the hands of relatives, neighbours, other 
displaced persons, or been expropriated by the government and re-allocated 
to other people. Some displaced persons return to ﬁnd that their relatives who 
remained behind have sub-divided their portion either among themselves, ceded 
it to their sons, or sold it off. Those involved in disputes may seek to have them 
resolved by traditional dispute resolution mechanisms (Bashingantahe) or though 
the judicial process. Research in nine provinces by Ligue ITEKA indicates that 
of all returnees who have sought outside assistance in disputes, over half have 
approached the Bashingantahe. Almost as many (48 per cent) have approached the 
local administration, while 28 per cent had applied to the Tribunaux de Residence 
(the local court system).84 These ﬁgures suggest that people are approaching more 
than one institution simultaneously; or that they have been referred from one 
institution to another. This is because a case cannot be made to the Tribunaux de 
Residence without the plaintiff ﬁrst approaching the Bashingantahe.85 The strategy 
of approaching more than one system (often known as ‘forum shopping’) can 
over time result in the undermining of some systems. The classic case involves 
a situation where local customary approaches are weakened because when their 
judgements are unfavourable to one party, that person will then go to a formal 
institution to try to get a different outcome.
Instances of corruption have been reported in both processes. In particular, the 
formal state justice system requires that plaintiffs have ﬁnancial resources to see 
a case to the end, and apart from the lowest level (the Tribunaux de Residence) 
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it is an almost exclusively Tutsi institution. According to some reports, it lacks 
local credibility, especially in Hutu-dominated areas. From this perspective then, 
while aiming for a long-term rejuvenation of all state organs, it makes sense for 
land-related disputes to be primarily addressed at the local level, particularly 
through the Bashingantahe. However, some analysts question the role that the 
Bashingantahe could play in future, especially because many local people blame 
some Bashingantahe for failing to prevent the 1993/4 mass killings. Given these 
dynamics, it appears that attempts to invigorate the institution should include 
substantial local participation.
Addressing Different Kinds of Land Rights
Often, attempts to address problems of post-conﬂict land rights concentrate on 
particular kinds of land access and use – such as ownership rights over urban land, 
and ownership or use rights for agriculture in rural areas. However, other kinds of 
land rights may be important. In many African countries, grazing rights, ﬁshing 
rights, and rights to use forest areas and products are important for particular 
communities. There are multiple users, engaged in multiple activities, on the 
same land.86 These users may have different social or political status, so that 
some claims may be legitimate at all social levels, whilst others may be seen as 
illegitimate or merely ‘tolerated’. 
In conﬂict-prone contexts, the legitimacy of different claims may alter frequently 
according to political, conﬂict-related criteria, and due to the inﬂuence of 
belligerents. In parts of southern Sudan for example, Nuer and other communities 
have a seasonal ﬁshing cycle which involves the creation of large ﬁshing camps 
near rivers and marshes. The location of these changes according to the availability 
of water and ﬁsh; similarly, the location of seasonal grazing areas and ‘cattle 
camps’ varies according to climatic factors and relations with neighbouring 
communities. In the Great Lakes, communities such as the Twa rely heavily on 
non-timber forest products (traditionally taken from areas which may now be 
protected conservation zones). Such rights – which do not represent claims to 
ownership but rather seasonal access – may be overlooked by an emphasis on 
permanent buildings, farm plots and commercial market-based activities. 
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Policy-Making in Post-Conﬂict Contexts
Policy-making in post-conﬂict circumstances is subject to the lingering effects of 
conﬂict. These challenges are social, economic, and political. In the Great Lakes 
Region, the loss of human capital and institutional knowledge due to conﬂict 
has been a problem, and the ﬁnancial burden of ‘emergency’ reconstruction and 
relief efforts have also limited investment in longer-term policy research and 
development. However, perhaps the most important challenge, particularly for a 
sensitive domain such as land tenure which affects every household in the country, 
is the incorporation of the views of all stakeholders in policy-making, whilst 
simultaneously maintaining government control of a process that is potentially 
volatile. 
In most parts of Africa, non-governmental actors have started to play an important 
part in the policy-formulation process, due both to their importance in the 
implementation of such policies (often a result of access to external funding 
sources) and to their technical capacity in particular areas. Despite the existence 
of a plethora of NGOs and community-based organisations (CBOs), many of 
them highly effective individually, in general civil society in the region is as a 
whole divided and somewhat disorganised.87 Civil society organisations, like any 
institutions, function through networks which rely on trust and mutual support, 
which have been undermined by the legacy of violence.88 As in other countries, 
though perhaps to a greater degree, dependence on external funding limits their 
ability to plan and implement long-term programmes. There is also, as is true of 
other sectors, a rural-urban divide, and some urban-based organisations do not 
maintain strong grassroots links.89 
This has repercussions beyond the policy-development phase. The test of any land 
tenure reform process is not the quality of the policy or legislative frameworks, but 
the extent to which the policy is effectively implemented. The style of governance 
in the country then becomes all-important in any assessment of whether the 
political will exists, at various levels, to ensure that policy will be implemented 
evenly and effectively. Rwanda provides one example of how governance and land 
policy remains overshadowed by past conﬂict.
The Arusha Accords of 1993 may have recognized the political importance of 
land but did not provide adequate consideration of land access and distribution. 
As part of the negotiations it was agreed that people who were outside of Rwanda 
for 10 or more years would not claim right on the property they held before 
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leaving Rwanda. At the same time it stipulated that all Rwandans had rights to 
property.  When the genocide was stopped and the post-genocide government 
was established, there was a large inﬂow of Rwandans who had ﬂed the country. 
Those who left due to violence and repression in 1959, 1963, 1973 and other 
years entered Rwanda in large numbers starting from 1994. As mentioned above, 
they are generally known as the ‘old caseload’, are almost all Tutsi, and numbered 
about a million. 
Many of these people occupied lands belonging to those who had ﬂed Rwanda 
during the genocide. On their return, those who had ﬂed in the immediate aftermath 
of the war and genocide – who are almost entirely Hutu and became known as 
the ‘new caseload’ – tried to access these same lands. In many cases, the ofﬁcial 
government policy of land sharing was followed, though this was sometimes 
problematic in practice.
The present problems of access are therefore those of contested rights to land 
that arose from largely political happenings in the past. The old caseload, many 
of which have little or no land, is perceived by government ofﬁcials to ‘continue 
to feel cheated90‘ that their property was distributed to others by the government 
after the 1960s, largely through a process known as amasambu ya demokrasi 
– ‘plots of democracy’.91 Some members of the new caseload, who have shared 
part of their plots with returning old caseload families, may be unhappy because 
they now have smaller plots than those they possessed before 1994. Moreover the 
sharing process was not supported by any written legislation. Those who shared 
land  - and any capital investments on the piece of land, such as coffee plantations 
or banana stands  - were not compensated.
The Land Policy, in its section on the historical background to the land issue, notes 
that many people were landless even prior to the civil war and the events of 1994. 
As has been documented elsewhere, many people have become landless through 
distress sales of land, or sheer land scarcity within a family, resulting in some sons 
being unable to inherit land.92 Other forms of landless including those depending 
on renting or sharecropping need to be addressed. Women, particularly widowed, 
divorced or single women, are also vulnerable to landlessness. The government 
has noted this elsewhere.93 It is also possible that some of the ‘new case’ refugees 
were unable to gain access to lands when they returned – it was not unknown 
for someone to be falsely accused of being involved in the genocide in the years 
after 1994, and this discouraged some people from claiming their land rights too 
vociferously.94
However, after this historical section, the policy deﬁnes the landless speciﬁcally 
as ‘old case’ refugees who have returned: Rwandans who ﬂed the country in 1959 
or later and stayed outside the country for more than 10 years.95 No other type of 
landless person is mentioned.
The policy’s solution to the problem of landlessness is redistribution of Private and 
Public State land, including non-occupied, escheated and unexploited reserves. It 
is apparent that if such a land reserve will be reserved only for the ‘old case’ 
refugees, then this deﬁnition and the approach to the solution will appear biased 
towards one social group. It is true that this group is genuinely a major victim 
of the land problem in Rwanda. Analysts have noted that the ‘10-year rule’ and 
the provision for formation of grouped settlements (villagisation) in the Arusha 
Accords seem to violate the property and housing rights of the ‘old case’ refugees, 
under international law.96 The rights of the ‘old case’ refugees has already become 
one of the most visibly controversial aspects of the policy.97 However, the issue of 
landlessness is much wider than this, and will continue to expand as relative land 
scarcity increases. The policy is silent on how, and by who, the land reserve will 
be allocated: ﬁrm criteria need to be set in place and a balance needs to be struck 
between centralized authority over the process (which would have the drawback 
of insufﬁcient detailed knowledge of local situations) and local authority, for 
example, through the District land commissions (which would risk bias through 
personal links with those affected).
In addition, the conﬂict and genocide has – understandably--led the government 
to frown upon any mention of ethnicity. This has made life difﬁcult for those 
advocating for improved land access rights for the Batwa–a minority social group 
in Rwanda who were traditionally hunter-gatherers and have been largely denied 
land tenure security since colonial times–are also not mentioned. Historically, as 
other communities encroached upon forests, the Twa were forced to retreat into 
smaller and smaller pockets of land. LandNet Rwanda, a network of NGOs, has 
been advocating for greater appreciation of the Twa as a marginalized stakeholder 
group, but it seems that they have yet to be heeded, and the ‘ethnic’ issue is one 
dynamic in this situation.98 
Overall, there is a need to redeﬁne the issue of landlessness. It is imperative to 
establish the extent, rate of growth, and the nature of landlessness in Rwanda, and 
the coping strategies arising from it. The policy perhaps requires a timeframe for 
distribution of the ‘land reserve’, as the number of landless people will continue 
to grow in the future. A fuller exploration of the phenomenon would inform a 
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leaving Rwanda. At the same time it stipulated that all Rwandans had rights to 
property.  When the genocide was stopped and the post-genocide government 
was established, there was a large inﬂow of Rwandans who had ﬂed the country. 
Those who left due to violence and repression in 1959, 1963, 1973 and other 
years entered Rwanda in large numbers starting from 1994. As mentioned above, 
they are generally known as the ‘old caseload’, are almost all Tutsi, and numbered 
about a million. 
Many of these people occupied lands belonging to those who had ﬂed Rwanda 
during the genocide. On their return, those who had ﬂed in the immediate aftermath 
of the war and genocide – who are almost entirely Hutu and became known as 
the ‘new caseload’ – tried to access these same lands. In many cases, the ofﬁcial 
government policy of land sharing was followed, though this was sometimes 
problematic in practice.
The present problems of access are therefore those of contested rights to land 
that arose from largely political happenings in the past. The old caseload, many 
of which have little or no land, is perceived by government ofﬁcials to ‘continue 
to feel cheated90‘ that their property was distributed to others by the government 
after the 1960s, largely through a process known as amasambu ya demokrasi 
– ‘plots of democracy’.91 Some members of the new caseload, who have shared 
part of their plots with returning old caseload families, may be unhappy because 
they now have smaller plots than those they possessed before 1994. Moreover the 
sharing process was not supported by any written legislation. Those who shared 
land  - and any capital investments on the piece of land, such as coffee plantations 
or banana stands  - were not compensated.
The Land Policy, in its section on the historical background to the land issue, notes 
that many people were landless even prior to the civil war and the events of 1994. 
As has been documented elsewhere, many people have become landless through 
distress sales of land, or sheer land scarcity within a family, resulting in some sons 
being unable to inherit land.92 Other forms of landless including those depending 
on renting or sharecropping need to be addressed. Women, particularly widowed, 
divorced or single women, are also vulnerable to landlessness. The government 
has noted this elsewhere.93 It is also possible that some of the ‘new case’ refugees 
were unable to gain access to lands when they returned – it was not unknown 
for someone to be falsely accused of being involved in the genocide in the years 
after 1994, and this discouraged some people from claiming their land rights too 
vociferously.94
However, after this historical section, the policy deﬁnes the landless speciﬁcally 
as ‘old case’ refugees who have returned: Rwandans who ﬂed the country in 1959 
or later and stayed outside the country for more than 10 years.95 No other type of 
landless person is mentioned.
The policy’s solution to the problem of landlessness is redistribution of Private and 
Public State land, including non-occupied, escheated and unexploited reserves. It 
is apparent that if such a land reserve will be reserved only for the ‘old case’ 
refugees, then this deﬁnition and the approach to the solution will appear biased 
towards one social group. It is true that this group is genuinely a major victim 
of the land problem in Rwanda. Analysts have noted that the ‘10-year rule’ and 
the provision for formation of grouped settlements (villagisation) in the Arusha 
Accords seem to violate the property and housing rights of the ‘old case’ refugees, 
under international law.96 The rights of the ‘old case’ refugees has already become 
one of the most visibly controversial aspects of the policy.97 However, the issue of 
landlessness is much wider than this, and will continue to expand as relative land 
scarcity increases. The policy is silent on how, and by who, the land reserve will 
be allocated: ﬁrm criteria need to be set in place and a balance needs to be struck 
between centralized authority over the process (which would have the drawback 
of insufﬁcient detailed knowledge of local situations) and local authority, for 
example, through the District land commissions (which would risk bias through 
personal links with those affected).
In addition, the conﬂict and genocide has – understandably--led the government 
to frown upon any mention of ethnicity. This has made life difﬁcult for those 
advocating for improved land access rights for the Batwa–a minority social group 
in Rwanda who were traditionally hunter-gatherers and have been largely denied 
land tenure security since colonial times–are also not mentioned. Historically, as 
other communities encroached upon forests, the Twa were forced to retreat into 
smaller and smaller pockets of land. LandNet Rwanda, a network of NGOs, has 
been advocating for greater appreciation of the Twa as a marginalized stakeholder 
group, but it seems that they have yet to be heeded, and the ‘ethnic’ issue is one 
dynamic in this situation.98 
Overall, there is a need to redeﬁne the issue of landlessness. It is imperative to 
establish the extent, rate of growth, and the nature of landlessness in Rwanda, and 
the coping strategies arising from it. The policy perhaps requires a timeframe for 
distribution of the ‘land reserve’, as the number of landless people will continue 
to grow in the future. A fuller exploration of the phenomenon would inform a 
Land, Conﬂict and Livelihoods  in the Great Lakes Region.  Testing Policies to the Limit C. Huggins, P. Kamungi, J. Kariuki, H. Musahara, J. S. Oketch, K.Vlassenroot, and J.W.Wakhungu
32
holistic and comprehensive policy on landlessness, with an accountable system 
and clear criteria for allocation, that will not lead to social tensions and would 
hence mitigate a latent source of future conﬂict.
4. Conclusions
Evidence supports the contention that, “land issues are almost always part of the 
conﬂict, and ignoring these could lead to a non-sustainable land administration 
system, and even threaten the post-conﬂict situation in general”.99 The situation 
in any country, and indeed in different parts of single states, is unique. However, 
there are some general patterns that are often evident in post-conﬂict situations. 
Access to land for many people is often fundamentally altered. The most visible 
aspect of this is population displacement; often due to systematic ethnic cleansing. 
However, the direct use of force to alter patterns of land access is only one of a 
number of process involved. Land tenure is a system of rights and responsibilities–
essentially, a social contract between people. Conﬂict changes social relationships 
in profound ways, and perceptions of mutual rights and responsibilities between 
individuals, social groups, and the state are altered due to changes in perceived 
legitimacy of institutions and obligations. In countries such as DRC, Rwanda 
and Burundi, the role of local leaders – both traditional and ‘modern’ – are key 
to this. 
External support for land administration systems in Africa often focus on titling 
programmes and other activities which aim to provide maximum security of 
tenure for commercial activities in urban areas as well as large rural farms. 
While there is some justiﬁcation in this approach–based on the assumption that 
improved tenure security will lead to increased domestic and foreign investment, 
and hence economic growth – it should not be pursued at the expense of the rights 
of the rural majority. Given the threats to rural land rights – from intimidation, 
from ‘land grabbing’ by non-violent means, and from sheer lack of access to 
information, and justice, especially for women – these should be prioritized. As 
stated earlier, the solution will not be found in the extension of ‘urban’ solutions 
(i.e. titling) across the country, but rather a process of adaptation and melding of 
customary and ‘modern’ systems.
The case studies demonstrate that the long-term social and political consequences 
of forced displacement and re-allocation of land belonging to those who have 
ﬂed have been exacerbated by the lack of an effective legal framework for land 
allocation and distribution. This has led to great uncertainty about the security of 
tenure. More profoundly perhaps, even those situations with a clear (if insufﬁcient) 
legal framework have proven problematic, not just due to corruption, lack of 
enforcement capacity and lack of political will, but also due to a fundamental 
conceptual disconnect between state systems and customary systems. Because 
of this, there is a need for all activities related to land to look not just at the de 
jure systems, but at the de facto realities on the ground, which may differ widely 
across a single country.
A range of important questions remain about the nature of policy reforms necessary 
to address land issues in order to prevent violence, during and following conﬂict. 
The transition between ‘conﬂict’ and ‘post-conﬂict’ is never clear. In terms of the 
causes of violence, conﬂict may never be fully resolved; in terms of the violence 
itself, it may continue sporadically well past the ofﬁcial declaration of ‘peace’.100 
Certain areas may be particularly affected, and indeed may not come under the 
control of the post-conﬂict government for months, or years. This is especially 
true in Africa, where remote areas are inaccessible due to lack of infrastructure. 
In such cases, given the long-term nature of insecurity, land issues in remote areas 
should not be neglected until ‘peace’ comes. Solutions, no matter how imperfect, 
should be found.
Another issue of particular relevance in situations where transitional governments 
incorporate former belligerents, who remain divided in terms of the national vision 
and development objectives. A common situation involves former military or 
political leaders being given control of particular Ministries or institutions under 
the terms of a peace agreement. This leads to differing objectives in government 
being reﬂected by inter-ministerial struggles. Much more research is needed on the 
politics of policy-making in such difﬁcult institutional environments, especially 
in terms of the role of civil society organisations, the most effective means of 
external support, the mechanisms for consultation and participation of local 
people, and the timing of policy processes in the transition from open conﬂict to 
‘normal’ development activities.
Finally, it is clear that despite the surge in interest in addressing land issues in 
post-conﬂict contexts, each situation is still being tackled in ad hoc ways. There 
is an urgent need for the UN and other agencies to develop a systematic set of 
guidelines and policies for post-conﬂict land administration and assistance for 
land and property issues arising due to conﬂict and population displacement. This 
has been recognized by experts in this ﬁeld including UNHCR and UN-HABITAT 
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holistic and comprehensive policy on landlessness, with an accountable system 
and clear criteria for allocation, that will not lead to social tensions and would 
hence mitigate a latent source of future conﬂict.
4. Conclusions
Evidence supports the contention that, “land issues are almost always part of the 
conﬂict, and ignoring these could lead to a non-sustainable land administration 
system, and even threaten the post-conﬂict situation in general”.99 The situation 
in any country, and indeed in different parts of single states, is unique. However, 
there are some general patterns that are often evident in post-conﬂict situations. 
Access to land for many people is often fundamentally altered. The most visible 
aspect of this is population displacement; often due to systematic ethnic cleansing. 
However, the direct use of force to alter patterns of land access is only one of a 
number of process involved. Land tenure is a system of rights and responsibilities–
essentially, a social contract between people. Conﬂict changes social relationships 
in profound ways, and perceptions of mutual rights and responsibilities between 
individuals, social groups, and the state are altered due to changes in perceived 
legitimacy of institutions and obligations. In countries such as DRC, Rwanda 
and Burundi, the role of local leaders – both traditional and ‘modern’ – are key 
to this. 
External support for land administration systems in Africa often focus on titling 
programmes and other activities which aim to provide maximum security of 
tenure for commercial activities in urban areas as well as large rural farms. 
While there is some justiﬁcation in this approach–based on the assumption that 
improved tenure security will lead to increased domestic and foreign investment, 
and hence economic growth – it should not be pursued at the expense of the rights 
of the rural majority. Given the threats to rural land rights – from intimidation, 
from ‘land grabbing’ by non-violent means, and from sheer lack of access to 
information, and justice, especially for women – these should be prioritized. As 
stated earlier, the solution will not be found in the extension of ‘urban’ solutions 
(i.e. titling) across the country, but rather a process of adaptation and melding of 
customary and ‘modern’ systems.
The case studies demonstrate that the long-term social and political consequences 
of forced displacement and re-allocation of land belonging to those who have 
ﬂed have been exacerbated by the lack of an effective legal framework for land 
allocation and distribution. This has led to great uncertainty about the security of 
tenure. More profoundly perhaps, even those situations with a clear (if insufﬁcient) 
legal framework have proven problematic, not just due to corruption, lack of 
enforcement capacity and lack of political will, but also due to a fundamental 
conceptual disconnect between state systems and customary systems. Because 
of this, there is a need for all activities related to land to look not just at the de 
jure systems, but at the de facto realities on the ground, which may differ widely 
across a single country.
A range of important questions remain about the nature of policy reforms necessary 
to address land issues in order to prevent violence, during and following conﬂict. 
The transition between ‘conﬂict’ and ‘post-conﬂict’ is never clear. In terms of the 
causes of violence, conﬂict may never be fully resolved; in terms of the violence 
itself, it may continue sporadically well past the ofﬁcial declaration of ‘peace’.100 
Certain areas may be particularly affected, and indeed may not come under the 
control of the post-conﬂict government for months, or years. This is especially 
true in Africa, where remote areas are inaccessible due to lack of infrastructure. 
In such cases, given the long-term nature of insecurity, land issues in remote areas 
should not be neglected until ‘peace’ comes. Solutions, no matter how imperfect, 
should be found.
Another issue of particular relevance in situations where transitional governments 
incorporate former belligerents, who remain divided in terms of the national vision 
and development objectives. A common situation involves former military or 
political leaders being given control of particular Ministries or institutions under 
the terms of a peace agreement. This leads to differing objectives in government 
being reﬂected by inter-ministerial struggles. Much more research is needed on the 
politics of policy-making in such difﬁcult institutional environments, especially 
in terms of the role of civil society organisations, the most effective means of 
external support, the mechanisms for consultation and participation of local 
people, and the timing of policy processes in the transition from open conﬂict to 
‘normal’ development activities.
Finally, it is clear that despite the surge in interest in addressing land issues in 
post-conﬂict contexts, each situation is still being tackled in ad hoc ways. There 
is an urgent need for the UN and other agencies to develop a systematic set of 
guidelines and policies for post-conﬂict land administration and assistance for 
land and property issues arising due to conﬂict and population displacement. This 
has been recognized by experts in this ﬁeld including UNHCR and UN-HABITAT 
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personnel, and efforts are underway to develop such guidelines and policies.101 
Improved convergence by donors and international development agencies on best 
practice in conﬂict-sensitive land policy design is also necessary.
Recommendations
1. In many post-conﬂict situations, the operation of land markets is unlikely to 
beneﬁt the poor due to the distorting effects of war and displacement and the 
massive disparities in income in the country. The operation of land markets 
should be carefully monitored in order to identify trends, and means to mitigate 
some of the negative effects. It would be preferable that the Rwandan land 
policy, and the Land Code in Burundi, should limit the size of land holdings 
per individual in order to help redistribute land resources. The current law in 
Burundi should be amended to include a provision allowing for equal access 
to land and property for women, while in Rwanda the legal framework is better 
but implementation remains problematic.
2. In many countries, there remains a lack of knowledge of land policy and law 
amongst the general population. In countries such as Rwanda, it is also unclear 
how much different components of the new land administration system will 
cost, and hence how ﬁnancially feasible they are. The land policy should 
therefore be piloted in limited areas, and the results monitored, before being 
applied more widely. Based on the pilot experiences, the government should 
be ready to amend the land policy. This is also true of Burundi and may also 
be necessary in DRC if the land law is altered.
3. Countries such as Burundi and Rwanda are under such severe demographic 
stress, because of lack of off-farm opportunities, that innovative agricultural 
and rural development strategies may be required. However, given the tensions 
evident in post-conﬂict societies, implementation of land policies should not be 
based on compulsion, and the government should ensure that implementation 
does not lead to increased landlessness.
4. Civil society organisations should be involved in policy implementation, 
especially awareness raising and dissemination of the key aspects of policy; 
capacity building; and monitoring of the socio-economic and gender impacts 
of policies. The ability of civil society to contribute to the process of policy 
development and implementation is different in each country, but in general 
there are large gaps in capacity between a) urban-based NGOs and rural 
organisations, and b) national and international organisations. Access to 
information on land-related issues, especially for IDPs and refugees, is a key 
issue which local and regional NGOs can address. It is important to build the 
capacity of local NGO networks to advocate for the land rights of the poor, 
and the absence of other effective mechanisms for non-governmental input, 
civil society capacity should be one factor inﬂuencing the timing of the policy 
development process. 
5. There is a move in countries such as Rwanda and Burundi to decentralize some 
aspects of land administration and decision-making to the local level. This is 
a positive step, but in order to represent the poor majority, the composition 
of the land commissions should include representatives of those ‘voiceless’ 
sections of society who are most easily marginalized as well as those with 
greater technical and planning abilities.
6. The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, which are non-binding, 
have been incorporated into national legislation in some countries.102 These 
examples should be followed in other African countries, and supported by 
local by-laws, training, and information dissemination as necessary.
7. Post-conﬂict governments, especially those with negative experiences of 
multi-party systems, are understandably slow to democratize after conﬂict. 
However, a more transparent dialogue within each country on governance and 
post conﬂict reconstruction is important, particularly in light of the tendency 
towards increasing economic and political dominance of urban-based elites. 
Effective implementation of a fundamental and sensitive issue such as land 
will not be possible without transparency. 
8. Despite the involvement of some inequitable alienation of land, or in conﬂicts, 
customary mediators and chiefs retain some legitimacy, particularly in areas 
where many local people question the legitimacy of higher-level state organs. 
They must therefore be involved in the mitigation and ultimately the resolution 
of land conﬂicts, but only through a process of open discussion about the 
role of various parties in the land access crisis. Local institutions should be 
revamped and strengthened, with membership decided through participatory 
means, in order to reduce the risk of political interference and corruption. In 
addition, legal clinics for land-related disputes should be supported.
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personnel, and efforts are underway to develop such guidelines and policies.101 
Improved convergence by donors and international development agencies on best 
practice in conﬂict-sensitive land policy design is also necessary.
Recommendations
1. In many post-conﬂict situations, the operation of land markets is unlikely to 
beneﬁt the poor due to the distorting effects of war and displacement and the 
massive disparities in income in the country. The operation of land markets 
should be carefully monitored in order to identify trends, and means to mitigate 
some of the negative effects. It would be preferable that the Rwandan land 
policy, and the Land Code in Burundi, should limit the size of land holdings 
per individual in order to help redistribute land resources. The current law in 
Burundi should be amended to include a provision allowing for equal access 
to land and property for women, while in Rwanda the legal framework is better 
but implementation remains problematic.
2. In many countries, there remains a lack of knowledge of land policy and law 
amongst the general population. In countries such as Rwanda, it is also unclear 
how much different components of the new land administration system will 
cost, and hence how ﬁnancially feasible they are. The land policy should 
therefore be piloted in limited areas, and the results monitored, before being 
applied more widely. Based on the pilot experiences, the government should 
be ready to amend the land policy. This is also true of Burundi and may also 
be necessary in DRC if the land law is altered.
3. Countries such as Burundi and Rwanda are under such severe demographic 
stress, because of lack of off-farm opportunities, that innovative agricultural 
and rural development strategies may be required. However, given the tensions 
evident in post-conﬂict societies, implementation of land policies should not be 
based on compulsion, and the government should ensure that implementation 
does not lead to increased landlessness.
4. Civil society organisations should be involved in policy implementation, 
especially awareness raising and dissemination of the key aspects of policy; 
capacity building; and monitoring of the socio-economic and gender impacts 
of policies. The ability of civil society to contribute to the process of policy 
development and implementation is different in each country, but in general 
there are large gaps in capacity between a) urban-based NGOs and rural 
organisations, and b) national and international organisations. Access to 
information on land-related issues, especially for IDPs and refugees, is a key 
issue which local and regional NGOs can address. It is important to build the 
capacity of local NGO networks to advocate for the land rights of the poor, 
and the absence of other effective mechanisms for non-governmental input, 
civil society capacity should be one factor inﬂuencing the timing of the policy 
development process. 
5. There is a move in countries such as Rwanda and Burundi to decentralize some 
aspects of land administration and decision-making to the local level. This is 
a positive step, but in order to represent the poor majority, the composition 
of the land commissions should include representatives of those ‘voiceless’ 
sections of society who are most easily marginalized as well as those with 
greater technical and planning abilities.
6. The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, which are non-binding, 
have been incorporated into national legislation in some countries.102 These 
examples should be followed in other African countries, and supported by 
local by-laws, training, and information dissemination as necessary.
7. Post-conﬂict governments, especially those with negative experiences of 
multi-party systems, are understandably slow to democratize after conﬂict. 
However, a more transparent dialogue within each country on governance and 
post conﬂict reconstruction is important, particularly in light of the tendency 
towards increasing economic and political dominance of urban-based elites. 
Effective implementation of a fundamental and sensitive issue such as land 
will not be possible without transparency. 
8. Despite the involvement of some inequitable alienation of land, or in conﬂicts, 
customary mediators and chiefs retain some legitimacy, particularly in areas 
where many local people question the legitimacy of higher-level state organs. 
They must therefore be involved in the mitigation and ultimately the resolution 
of land conﬂicts, but only through a process of open discussion about the 
role of various parties in the land access crisis. Local institutions should be 
revamped and strengthened, with membership decided through participatory 
means, in order to reduce the risk of political interference and corruption. In 
addition, legal clinics for land-related disputes should be supported.
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9. Land issues at national and regional levels cannot be addressed sufﬁciently by 
‘projects’, but only as part of a wider, long-term process of network-building 
between local, national and international institutions in order to build a constituency 
for peace and justice. The should involve a sustained but low-proﬁle programme of 
engagement by donors, informed by close grassroots involvement and research. 
10.In the DRC and indeed in other countries, land issues are so sensitive, 
complex and important that they cannot be managed simply by a ‘technical’ 
process (even when this involves consultation with civil society). Instead, 
society in general should have much more say. For example, a commission on 
land ownership should be established and charged with the responsibility to 
analyze the dynamics of land access nationwide, with a focus on areas where 
land access issues have been related to conﬂicts, and deliver a report within a 
limited timeframe. The commission should conduct extensive consultations, 
involving real community input from rural areas. Their recommendations 
should be approved by consensus amongst the concerned parties.
11.Off-farm livelihood alternatives should be supported. Efforts should be made 
to develop the private and informal sectors through vocational training and 
promotion of micro-ﬁnance enterprises to provide self-employment in non-
agricultural domains. Particular attention should be paid to demobilized 
soldiers and ex-rebels. These efforts should be seen within the long-term 
development of a regional labour market.
12.Regional economic cooperation should be supported. It is important that the 
regional and international community facilitate the free movement of labour 
in order for certain areas of the Great Lakes Region to overcome problems of 
land scarcity. Whilst there remain serious political obstacles, with continued 
negotiations and the support of the international community, mutually 
beneﬁcial terms could be identiﬁed.
13.Further research and information dissemination is necessary at all levels. 
There remain lacunae in information about such factors as the impact of long 
term displacement on society, the effects of HIV/AIDS on land rights, long 
term solutions to the problem of land scarcity, and other issues that have a 
direct bearing on sustainable peace. Research should be conducted in order to 
help policy makers to be sensitive to the highly varied and ﬂuid nature of land-
related issues in post-conﬂict countries, particularly in the context of refugee 
returns. There are no easy or uniform answers.
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  1. Summaries of these are available as “Policy Briefs” on the ACTS  
 website,www.acts.or.ke. Full versions will be published in collaboration  
 with the Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, in 2005.
  2. Juma, C. and Ojwang, J.B. (eds) (1996).
  3.  It does not attempt to provide an exhaustive study of the relationships  
 between conﬂict and land: for such an approach, the reader is directed to  
 some of the material in the references section, particularly OECD (2004).
  4.  See e.g. OECD (2001), Lewis, D. (2004), Thompson, N. (2003).
  5.  Pons-Vignon and Lecomte, (2004).
  6. See e.g. Pons-Vignon and Lecomte, (2004).
  7. See e.g. various chapters in Buckles, D. ed. (1999).
  8.  ACTS interview with former administrator, Bunia, April 2004. 
  9. See Moyroud, C. and Katunga, J., 2001.
10.  Meinzen-Dick, et al (1997).
11.  Moyo (2003).
12.  Law No. 73/21 of 1973, later amended and supplemented by Law No.  
 80/8 of 1980. See also Aide et Action Pour La Paix (2004).
13. See for example Van Acker, F., and Vlassenroot, K., op. cit.
14.  Prunier (1994), Ohlsson, L. (2001).
15.  See for example, Ndikumana, L. (2004).
16.  Deininger and Castagnini (2004).
17.  De Soto (2000). 
18.  See eg. Bruce and Adholla, eds (1994).
19.  Barry, M. and Fourie-McIntosh, C (2001).
20.  Lund, C. (2000).
21. Deininger (2003) refers to state-sponsored informalization, through not  
 in speciﬁc reference to DRC.
22.  See Plateau, J-P. (1996).
23.  See e.g. Delville, L. P. (2002).
24.  See Musahara and Huggins (forthcoming).
25.  This is locally referred to as droit de regard, the right to “look after” the  
 land  - though in the eyes of the law, the term droit de regard refers to  
 rights of management enjoyed by either the state (in which the correct  
 term is ‘eminent domain’) or the landowner.
26. Aide et Action Pour La Paix, op. cit.ACTS translation.
27.  See e.g Kane, M. L., Ayachi, M., Ennahli, L. 2004. 
28.  The ‘chef de collectivité’ was killed in an ambush on his vehicle during  
 the conﬂict.
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29. Interview, Bunia, February 2004.
30. The Hacienda model involved a large estate owned by a colonial  
 individual  but worked on by peasants with access to only small   
 household ‘gardens’ for their own use. See Deininger, K. (2003).
31.  The Sengwer community of Kenya are one example: see e.g.   
 Memorandum from Sengwer of Kenya presented to Constitution of Kenya  
 Review Commission, July 2002 http://www.ogiek.org/sitemap/memo- 
 seng-1.htm#3.2
32.  The overall national landlessness ﬁgure, for all ethnic groups, is 15 per  
 cent. See Jackson, D. (2003). 
33.  See Field-Juma, A. in Juma, C. and Ojwang, J.B. (eds) (1996).
34.  See Kenya Land Alliance (2004). 
35.  See Chabal and Daloz (1999).
36.  The use of the terms ‘Hema’ and ‘Lendu’ is a shorthand for a more  
 complex reality: there are in fact numerous sub-groups within the Lendu,  
 who are identiﬁed according to their geographical location, including the  
 Lendu-Pitsi, Djatsi, and Tatsi of the North, and the Ngiti (or Bindi) of  
 the south. The Hema also have sub-groups such as the Hema Boga of the  
 South, who became sedentary at an earlier point than other groups (Bureau   
 du Project Ituri, 1982).
37.  Lobho, J.-P (1971). 
38.  Asadho (1999) and Johnson, D.(2003).
39. Asadho, op. cit.; Sematumba, O. (2003).
40. Kassa, M., op. cit. Even as late as mid-2004, despite almost a year of  
 much-improved security, not all Lendu, Nande or Mbira inhabitants had  
 returned to Bunia town.
41.  Bureau du Project Ituri (1982).
42. Sematumba, O, (2003).
43. Bureau du Project Ituri, op. cit.
44. see e.g. Leisz, S. (1998).
45.  Sale of church land has been, since the 1973 land law, technically illegal,  
 as the state is the owner and the church is merely a leasee. 
46. Under Congolese law, all land belongs to the State. Use rights are  
 conferred  through leases of up to 99 years.
47.  This anecdotal evidence is also supported by Buoyalimwe, M. (1990).
48.  Crisp, (2000).
49. See UN-IRIN (2004).
50. Interview with local woman, Bunia, Ituri Territory, April 2004.
51. Andre & Plateau (1995).
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52. Lewis, D. (2004).
53. See Prunier, G. (1996).
54. See Augustinus and Barry. (2003). 
55. See e.g.  United Nations, Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of  
 Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic  
 Republic of the Congo, New York, 2001.
56. Often, gender roles change. Trauma, alcohol abuse and poverty   
 predispose families to situations of stress and domestic violence, which  
 ultimately leads to divorce or separation. See Kamungi, Prisca,   
 The Lives and Live-Choices of Internally Displaced Women in Kenya.  
 Nairobi: UNIFEM, 2001.
57. Sabimbona, S. (1998).
58. Interviews, IDP camp near Bujumbura, May 2004.
59. FAO and IFAD, (2003).   
60. Burke, E., Klot, J and Bunting, I. (2001).
61. UNCHS (1999).
62. As stated above, widows are not always able to keep their former  
 husband’s  land after his death, due to pressure from his relatives.  See  
 Burnet, J. (2000) and Pottier, J. (2002) In addition to customary norms,  
 Christian narratives have also been inﬂuential in shaping local   
 perceptions of the secondary status of women.
63. Burnet, J. (2000).
64. See Burnet, J. (2000) and Pottier, J. (2002).
65. Many women who have been raped are no longer seen as eligible for  
 marriage. Hamilton, H. (2000).
66. Interviews, Butare, April 2003.
67. Interviews in Butare, April 2004. In fact, the law is not retro-active,  
 though this may not be widely understood.
68. Interview with land specialist in Kigali, May 2004.
69. Burnet, J. (2000).
70. See for example Thompson, N. (2003).
71. See Kitay, M. (1998).
72. Thompson, N. (2003).
73. Interviews, Bujumbura, May 2004; and International Crisis Group (2003). 
74. International Crisis Group (2003). 
75. For some members of the CNRS are known for extremist political  
 positions and have questionable   backgrounds in terms of human rights.
76. Nkurunziza, J. D. and Ngaruko, F. (2002). 
77. Ligue ITEKA (2003).
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78. Interviews with Francois Ngendahayo: Minister of Repatriation,   
 Reintegration and Reconstruction; Terence Nahimana, M. P.; and NGO  
 personnel. Bujumbura, April 2004.
79. These NGOs include Global Rights and League ITEKA.
80. Most of the refugees who ﬂed due to violence in 1988 returned to their  
 hills within six months.
81. Nyanza-Lac and Rumonge are the classic cases of especially problematic  
 areas.
82. International Crisis Group (2003). 
83. Interview with IRIN staff who had conducted research in the refugees  
 camps in Tanzania. 
84. Ligue ITEKA (2003).
85. However, cases involving very valuable property may go directly to the  
 Tribuneaux.
86. See e.g. Cousins, B. (1996).
87. As in other countries, ‘civil society’ is often wrongly associated solely  
 with NGOs. By deﬁnition however it should include any association or  
 social groups outside of the realm of government. 
88. Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2001). 
89. See e.g. Management Systems International (2003). 
90. The quote is from the Draft Land Policy.
91. See Republic of Rwanda Ministry of Lands (2004) see also Catherine  
 Andre (1998) who identiﬁes the issue of returnees as a possible source of  
 social tension.
92. See for example Andre C., Plateau, J-P., (1996).
93. Republic of Rwanda (2002).
94. According to human rights organisations, many people detained soon  
 after 1994 were innocent victims of property disputes, and were some of  
 those who ‘disappeared’ in the early post-genocide years. See Pottier  
 (2002). With the improvement in social relations over the last decade, it is 
 possible that some have been able to reclaim lands.
95. Section 5.1.2.3 of the draft land policy.
96. See for example Jones, L. (undated).
97. See Bugingo, S. (2004).
98. See Burnet, J. (2001).
99. Zevenbergen, J. and van der Molen, P. (2004).
100. Thompson, N. (2003) Access to Land in Post-Conﬂict Situations: an  
 Analytical Paper. FAO, Rome.
101. This was the conclusion reached at the UNHCR/UN-HABITAT   
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 Expert Roundtable Meeting on Housing, Land and Property Rights  
 in Post-Conﬂict Societies: proposals for their Integration into UN Policy  
 and Operational Frameworks, held in Geneva in November 2004.
102. See UN-IRIN (2004).
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